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ABSTRACT	
	
PATEL,	NAYAN.	Does	Being	Cultured	Pay?	Racial	and	Language	Concordance	and	its	
Effect	on	Physician	Income.	
	 Department	of	Economics,	June	2012	
	
Issues	surrounding	race	and	ethnicity	in	healthcare	have	increased	in	
number	as	racial	disparities	as	well	as	minority	physicians	become	more	prevalent	
in	the	USA.	One	such	issue	is	the	concordance	rate	of	race	and	language	amongst	
physicians	and	their	patients.		
	 The	effect	of	racial	concordance	in	physician	patient	relationships	has	been	
looked	at	to	determine	if	it	affects	the	perceived	level	of	health	quality.	Saha	et	al.	
(1999)	found	that	Black	and	Hispanic	patients	were	more	satisfied	in	their	
healthcare	when	treated	by	a	physician	of	their	own	race.	In	this	study,	I	establish	
whether	or	not	the	racial	concordance	has	a	positive	effect	on	income.	Using	
controls	established	by	previous	regression	analyses,	I	measure	the	effect	on	income	
of	racial	concordance	on	primary	care	and	specialty	care	physicians	alike.				
	 The	findings	of	this	study	have	importance	in	terms	of	incentives	for	
physicians	to	culture	themselves.	If	racial	concordance	increases	income,	it	is	likely	
that	empathy,	communication	skills,	and	teamwork	is	better	when	physicians	and	
patients	have	the	same	race	(Cooper‐Patrick	et	al.	1999).	This	suggests	that	
physicians	who	are	culturally	competent	will	enjoy	higher	incomes,	and	their	
patients	better	health	outcomes.	Policy	implications	including	cultural	competency	
training	in	medical	schools	and	required	interpreter	services	may	be	established	
from	these	findings.	
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CHAPTER	ONE	
INTRODUCTION	
A.	Racial	Concordance	and	Communication	
	
	 Minority	populations	have	become	notorious	for	underutilization	of	health	
care	services	(Burgess	et	al.	2008).	At	the	same	time,	minority	physicians	are	
becoming	more	and	prevalent	(Brown	et	al.	2007).	Racial	concordance	in	the	
physician	patient	relationship	is	an	occurrence	that	is	a	result	of	both	of	these	
scenarios.	Previous	research	has	shown	that,	not	only	do	minority	populations	
underutilize	health	care,	but	are	actually	less	satisfied	with	their	health	care	
providers	than	white	patients	(Doescher	et	al.	2000).	When	given	selection	to	
choose	a	physician,	minority	patients	often	choose	one	of	their	own	race	(Gray	and	
Stoddard	1997),	and	satisfaction	improves	(LaViest	and	Nuru	Jeter	2002).	Studies	
have	posited	that	this	could	be	because	of	better	geographical	location,	or	because	of	
better	cultural	competence	and	communication	of	racially	concordant	physician	
patient	groups	(LaViest	et	al.	2003).	
	 This	study	examines	the	relationship	between	race	concordance,	language	
concordance,	and	physician	income.	Communication	is	key	in	a	patient‐physician	
relationship,	as,	without	it,	patients	are	likely	to	feel	uncomfortable	or	unwilling	to	
follow	through	with	physician	orders.	However,	when	patients	feel	as	though	their	
physician	is	working	with	them	as	a	team	rather	than	just	giving	orders,	patient	
satisfaction	and	utilization	of	the	health	care	system	increases	(Cooper	Patrick	et	al.	
1999).	These	improvements	in	health	care	result	from	better	communication	and	
mutual	understanding	of	needs,	as	well	as	a	teamwork	that	keeps	patients	invested	
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in	their	health	care	(Saha	et	al.	1999).	Thus,	I	also	test	the	importance	of	whether	or	
not	a	physician	utilizes	an	interpreter	service,	or	has	cultural	competency	training.	
	
B.	Income	as	a	Measure	of	Utilization	
	 	
Income	is	used	in	this	study	as	a	dependent	measure	of	utilization.	The	more	
patients	that	a	physician	sees,	the	more	that	physician	will	be	paid.	Controls	for	
capitation	and	other	forms	of	prospective	reimbursement	are	used	to	ensure	that	
income	is	a	result	of	patient	visits.	This	study	therefore	holds	importance	for	
physicians	as	well	as	patients.	If	enhanced	communication	in	terms	of	cultural	
understanding	through	race	concordance	and	language	leads	to	a	higher	income,	it	
may	be	worthwhile	for	physicians	to	access	cultural	competence	training	and	
acquire	another	language/interpreter.	In	terms	of	demand,	minority	physicians	may	
find	it	worthwhile	to	locate	their	practices	in	a	place	where	supply	of	their	own	race	
and	language	skills	is	low,	and	demand	high	or	increasing.	For	patients	who	are	
unsatisfied	with	their	provider,	it	could	be	that	they	lack	communication	and	a	more	
participatory	environment	in	their	healthcare	setting.	Minority	patients	may	be	
motivated	to	seek	a	physician	who	speaks	their	native	language,	and	therefore	enjoy	
better	health	outcomes	through	proper	utilization.			
	
C.	Contributions	of	this	Study	
	 Using	cross	sectional	data	retrieved	from	the	Health	Tracking	Physician	
Survey	in	2008,	this	study	conducts	a	regression	analysis	with	physician	income	as	
the	dependent	variable.	It	is	hypothesized	that	language	and	race	concordance	
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between	physician	and	patient	groups	increases	physician	income.	I	find	that	
cultural	competency	training	negatively	affects	physician	income	whereas	an	
interpreter	service	positively	affects	income.	The	results	on	racial	and	language	
concordance	depend	on	the	race	of	physician	and	patient.	
	Following	this	introduction	is	Chapter	Two,	which	is	a	literature	review,	
detailing	previous	research	studies	relevant	to	the	topic.		Chapter	Three	highlights	
the	econometric	model,	the	regression	equations	used	and	an	explanation	of	the	
variables,	as	well	as	how	those	variables	were	interpreted.	Chapter	Four	is	a	
description	of	the	data	set	used,	and	Chapter	Five	shows	the	results	of	the	
econometric	analysis.	Chapter	Six	ends	the	paper	with	conclusions	that	show	the	
policy	implications	of	the	results,	and	possible	future	research	opportunities.		
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CHAPTER	TWO	
RACE	AND	LANGUAGE	IN	THE	HEALTHCARE	LITERATURE	
To	determine	proper	controls	and	a	regression	model,	I	review	studies	that	
looked	at	race/ethnicity	and	physician	income.	This	review	also	covers	articles	that	
supply	possible	reasons	for	why	racial	and	language	concordance	may	affect	
income,	and	other	authors’	hypotheses.		
	
A.		Determinants	of	Physician	Income	
	 Weeks	and	Wallace’s	(2006)	study	on	the	effect	of	race	on	ob‐gyn	income	
uses	individual	level	data	on	physicians	to	determine	race	and	gender	effect	on	
income.	The	study	used	the	American	Medical	Association	(AMA)	Socioeconomic	
Monitoring	Survey	(SMS)	data.	This	dataset	is	composed	of	information	on	
physicians	practice	and	personal	characteristics	from	1992	to	2001.	In	order	to	
guarantee	they	had	the	same	variables	for	all	physicians,	Weeks	and	Wallace	(2006)	
further	specify	their	dataset.	They	do	this	by	only	including	physicians	who	returned	
responses	of	black	or	white	clinically	practicing	physicians,	and	eliminating	those	
who	did	not	answer	survey	questions	for	the	variables	they	needed.	This	process	
involves	choosing	physicians	who	graduated	from	a	US	medical	school,	reported	an	
annual	income,	visits	seen,	weeks	practiced,	years	in	practice,	percent	of	Medicaid	
patients,	and	whether	or	not	Medicare	patients	were	admitted.	The	net	income	is	
then	adjusted	to	2004	dollars.	They	also	avoid	extreme	outliers	in	income	and	
patient	visits	by	only	accepting	those	within	the	1st	and	99th	percentiles.	They	then	
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categorize	their	dependent	variables	into	three	classes:	“Physician	Work	Effort,”	
“Provider	characteristics,”	and	“Practice	characteristics”(Weeks	and	Wallace	2006).		
For	these	variables,	several	characteristics	are	observed.	Weeks	and	Wallace	
(2006)	take	into	account	number	of	patients	seen	as	well	as	hours	worked,	as	many	
physicians	are	reimbursed	via	number	of	cases	seen	rather	than	number	of	hours	
worked.	Considering	race	and	gender	may	affect	when	someone	enters	medical	
school,	years	since	graduating	are	taken	into	account	rather	than	age	of	physician.	
These	years	are	grouped	into	5	year	dummy	variable	categories	to	account	for	the	
inverted	U	shape	of	the	physician	income/age	curve.	Whether	or	not	the	physician	is	
board	certified	or	has	ownership	in	their	practice	affects	income,	so	must	be	
involved.	Medicare	and	Medicaid	reimbursements	are	generally	less	than	private	
insurance,	so	percentage	of	these	cases	affect	physician	income.	
Weeks	and	Wallace	(2006)	use	a	linear	regression	model	to	compare	race	
and	gender	in	physician	income.	They	thus	include	dummy	variables	for	every	race‐
gender	pair	they	were	investigating.	Using	SPSS	software,	they	compute	regression	
coefficients,	95%	confidence	intervals,	and	survey	weights.	If	variables	are	not	
normally	distributed,	they	are	log‐transformed.	The	final	step	of	analysis	was	a	
multi‐colinearity	test.		
Weeks	and	Wallace’s	(2006)	conclusions	are	that	female	and	black	
physicians	are	at	a	disadvantage	financially,	even	controlling	for	different	practice	
habits.	The	study	points	out	its	failings	in	that	there	was	not	enough	survey	
participation,	different	response	rates	existed	for	different	populations,	and	the	self	
reported	nature	of	the	survey	has	its	own	set	of	biases.	Some	of	the	biggest	concerns	
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that	the	current	study	has	are	that	the	variables	are	limited	by	the	data	set,	and	that	
quality	of	care	is	not	a	factor.		
Weeks	and	Wallace	(2006)	are	cited	by	many	other	authors	looking	at	
different	levels	of	data,	or	different	variables,	including	Reyes	(2007).	Though	
Reyes’	(2007)	study	is	focused	on	a	particular	specialty	of	physician,	it	incorporates	
subspecialty	into	the	regression	equation,	further	explaining	the	regression.	Reyes’	
(2007)	study	uses	the	American	College	of	Obstetricians	and	Gynecologists	(ACOG)	
individual	level	data	set,	which	includes	similar	data	as	the	SMS	on	physicians.	
Reyes	(2007)	utilizes	the	Princeton	Survey	Research	data	weights	to	adjust	the	data.	
Similar	to	Weeks	and	Wallace	(2006),	the	data	is	split	into	personal,	professional,	
and	practice	categories.	Reyes	(2007)	uses	a	log‐linear	approach,	to	estimate	
percentage	changes	in	income	due	to	her	variables.	The	“data	cleaning”	(Reyes	
2007)	process	for	the	study	includes	limiting	age	to	80,	including	only	those	sample	
that	had	all	of	her	variables	involved,	and	minimizing	outliers	by	including	incomes	
within	the	2nd	and	98th	percentile,	and	patient	visits	between	the	1st	and	99th	
percentile.	In	order	to	offset	bias	from	when	physicians	were	almost	wholly	male,	
Reyes(2007)	conducts	a	separate	analysis	of	obstetricians	under	40	years	of	age.	
The	regression	equation	in	this	study	includes	age,	years	in	practice,	fellowship,	type	
of	reimbursement,	and	other	specialty	specific	variables.	By	incorporating	specialty,	
Reyes	(2007)	is	able	to	differentiate	between	gender	bias	and	specialty	choice.	
Reyes	(2007)	conducts	a	regression	with	all	years	combined	(and	added	in	a	
variable	for	which	year	the	data	was	from)	as	well	as	each	individual	year	to	see	the	
coefficient	variance	throughout	the	years.	Reyes	(2007)	also	omits	a	particular	value	
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of	each	variable	as	a	regression	control.	This	study	also	used	ordinary	least	squares	
analysis.	Reyes	(2007)	also	uses	Oaxaca	Decomposition	to	analyze	the	difference	
between	gender	due	to	physician	activity	and	difference	due	to	pure	gender.	This	
method	can	also	be	used	for	racial	differences.		
Among	Reyes’	(2007)	results	of	lower	incomes	with	non	Caucasian	race,	
there	is	a	noticeable	decrease	in	this	gap	throughout	the	year	in	the	younger	
population.	This	suggests	a	narrowing	gap	in	different	race	incomes.	Age	is	not	
correlated	with	income	until	the	interaction	term	age*age	is	involved,	again	
correcting	for	the	inverted	U	relationship	between	income	and	age.		
	
B.	Race	and	the	Patient‐Physician	Relationship	
	 Previous	researchers	have	explained	some	ways	to	formulate	a	proper	
regression	equal	with	controls	for	physician	income	levels.	However,	there	are	
several	other	studies	that	have	contributed	to	the	topic	of	concordance	of	physician	
and	patient	race.	Saha,	Komaromy,	Koepsell,	and	Bindman	(1999)	illustrated	the	
subject’s	importance	in	their	study.	
	 Saha	et	al.	(1999)	begin	with	the	knowledge	that	minority	patients	both	used	
and	appreciated	fewer	medical	resources.	Using	the	Commonwealth	Fund	Minority	
Health	Survey	of	1994,	they	were	able	to	get	individual	level	data	for	adults	in	the	
US.	The	survey	gives	access	to	healthcare,	access,	physician,	and	personal	data.	From	
these	participants,	Saha	et	al.	(1999)	hold	approximately	3000	extra	phone	
interviews	with	even	amounts	of	white,	black,	and	Hispanic	patients.	The	variable	
categories	that	were	created	were	“Racial	Concordance,”	“Response	Variables,”	and	
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“Covariates.”	These	categories	allow	researchers	to	find	the	race	of	the	patients’	
primary	physicians,	patient	satisfaction	with	their	healthcare,	and	control	for	
demographic	confounding.		
	 Saha	et	al.	(1999)	analyze	data	significance	using	t‐tests	(continuous)	and	
Pearson	chi	squared	(binary,	categorical)	for	bivariate	racial	concordance.	The	
significance	of	the	concordance	is	calculated	using	a	logistic	regression.		As	in	their	
hypothesis,	they	find	that	black	and	Hispanic	patients	are	more	satisfied	with	their	
health	care	when	seen	by	black	and	Hispanic	doctors,	respectively.	Black	patients	
actually	are	more	satisfied	with	the	physician,	while	Hispanic	patients	with	their	
general	healthcare.	The	study	also	finds	that	minority	patients	disproportionately	
select	for	racially	concordant	physicians.	The	results	suggest	that	black	patients	feel	
they	are	more	respected	by	black	physicians,	which	could	be	a	result	of	cultural	
similarity	or	the	fact	that,	as	black	physicians	see	a	large	amount	of	black	patients,	
“cultural	competence”	(Saha	et	al.	1999).	
	 Saha	et	al.	(1999)	are	able	partially	explain	the	findings	of	Doescher,	Saver,	
Franks,	and	Fiscella	(2000),	where	minority	patients	are	less	likely	to	be	satisfied	
with	their	physician	than	white	patients.	American	doctors	are	mostly	white,	so	if	
concordance	matters	in	all	races,	white	patients	would	be	more	satisfied	than	the	
average	with	their	physicians.	These	findings	are	important	as	they	suggest	a	
positive	relationship	between	racial	concordance	and	physician	services	use.	Thus,	
if	applied	to	income,	it	may	be	that	physicians	who	practice	in	areas	where	their	
patients	will	be	racially	concordant,	they	may	see	and	be	reimbursed	by	more	
patients.	The	study	has	its	limitations	in	that	the	survey	held	selection	bias,	do	not	
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have	enough	detail	about	physician	race,	and	the	self‐response	survey	has	its	own	
bias.		
		 Cooper‐Patrick,	Gallo,	Gonzales,	Thi	Vu,	Powe,	Nelson,	and	Ford	(1999)	find	
similar	results	in	terms	of	quality	of	care	and	race	concordance.	The	physician	
subjects	of	this	study	were	recruited	from	a	randomized	clinical	trial	for	depression	
intervention.	Thus,	the	physicians	were	all	from	a	similar	area	in	New	York,	as	were	
their	patients.	Similar	to	Saha	et	al.	(1999)	the	variables	involve	patient	and	
physician	race	and	gender	concordance.	The	measure	of	quality	for	physicians	is	
their	“Participatory	Decision‐Making	(PDM)”	(Cooper‐Patrick	et	al.	1999),	or	how	
well	the	physicians	and	patients	work	as	a	team	on	a	scale	from	1‐100.	PDM	is	
measured	as	the	result	of	several	participation	related	survey	questions.	This	study	
finds	that	African	American	patients	viewed	their	physicians	PDM	as	lacking	in	
general.	However,	the	patients	who	have	physicians	who	are	also	African	American	
have	a	higher	rating	on	the	PDM	scale,	suggesting	the	racially	concordant	physician‐
patient	teams	are	working	better	together.	This	study	shows	yet	another	reason	
why	evaluating	patient‐physician	race	relationships	is	important:	the	ability	of	the	
physician	to	let	the	patient	take	some	charge	of	their	healthcare	has	a	bearing	on	
both	patient	health	and	satisfaction,	another	set	of	variables	that	can	affect	income.	
These	findings	are	similar	to	Laviest	and	Nuru‐Jeter	(2002),	who	find	that	patients	
who	are	able	to	choose	are	more	likely	to	have	racially	concordant	relationships.	
Each	group	also	records	more	satisfaction	with	their	physicians	than	when	the	races	
did	not	match.	Laviest	and	Nuru‐Jeter	(2002)	also	propose	that	this	suggests	better	
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physician	cultural	training	and	interpreter	services	are	necessary	for	minority	
patients.		
	 Brown,	Scheffler,	Tom,	and	Schulman	(2007)	add	another	layer	to	the	study	
and	involve	market	value	and	supply	and	demand	for	physicians.	Citing	that	patients	
are	more	satisfied	in	racially	concordant	relationships,	they	hypothesize	that	
physicians	of	certain	races,	when	low	in	supply	locally,	would	be	rewarded	from	
these	relationships.	Adding	supply	and	demand	criteria	explain	why,	where	supply	
is	high,	it	is	easier	to	tell	that	those	who	served	a	racially	concordant	population	
have	a	higher	income.	Brown	et	al.	(2007)	evaluate	the	supply	for	physicians	as	the	
percentage	of	the	local	physician	labor	force	from	a	specific	race,	and	demand	as	the	
percentage	of	that	local	patient	group	of	the	same	ethnicity.	The	study	then	shows	
the	difference	between	supply	and	demand	as	the	shortage	of	physicians	of	that	
particular	race.	Brown	et	al.	(2007)	add	median	income	for	the	local	area,	a	dummy	
for	each	geographical	location,	percentage	of	local	physician	workforce	of	each	race,	
and	percentage	of	local	population	of	each	race	as	variables	in	their	regression	
model.	The	interaction	between	physician	race	and	percent	of	the	population	of	the	
same	race	is	used	to	determine	whether	or	not	racial	concordance	affects	income,	
and	the	interaction	between	physician	race	and	local	physician	workforce	percent	is	
used	to	determine	if	the	supply	and	demand	for	that	physician	race	affected	income.	
Brown	et	al.	(2007)	find	that	racially	concordant	relationships	are	beneficial	in	
Asian	and	Hispanic	populations.	This	is	assumed	to	be	because	of	the	possible	
language	barriers	between	foreign	(and	sometimes	native)	born	Asian	and	Hispanic	
patients	and	their	doctors.	Thus,	this	study	will	involve	whether	or	not	the	physician	
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has	difficulty	with	any	languages	the	patients	speak,	as	well	as	whether	or	not	they	
have	an	interpreter	service	to	aid	them.	This	will	determine	whether	or	not	the	
change	in	income	is	due	to	communication	or	cultural	similarity.		
	 Saha,	Taggart,	Komaromy,	and	Bindman	(2000)	further	explore	the	
importance	of	language	and	communication.	Using	a	telephone	survey	data	set	from	
the	American	Commonwealth	Survey,	they	find	that	25%	of	Hispanic	patients	with	
Hispanic	doctors	specifically	chose	their	doctors	because	of	their	race	(Saha	et	al	
2000).	Of	those,	42%	factored	in	language	as	the	reason	(Saha	et	al	2000).	Thus,	
determining	whether	or	not	language	factors	into	income	is	an	important	factor.	
	
C.	Contributions	to	the	Literature	
	 		This	study	improves	on	previous	research	in	that	it	involves	language	as	
well	as	racial	concordance	when	looking	at	the	patient‐physician	relationship.	
Brown	et	al	(2007)	show	how	supply	and	demand	for	different	races	increases	
income	in	Hispanic	and	Asian	patient‐physician	pairs,	though	it	is	not	significant	for	
Black	patient‐physician	pairs.	As	most	of	the	Black	and	white	patient	population	
speaks	English,	along	with	the	fact	that	most	physicians	are	White,	speak	English	
and	trained	in	the	US,	communication	between	all	groups	could	be	optimal.	
However,	many	Asian	and	Hispanic	patients	come	from	abroad	and	may	speak	other	
languages.	Physicians	who	understand	their	culture	and	language	may	have	the	
advantage	in	treating	these	patients	and	having	a	higher	patient	cooperation	and	
follow	up	rate.	Thus,	language	is	an	important	addition	to	look	at	in	this	model.	
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CHAPTER	THREE	
ESTIMATING	THE	EFFECT	OF	RACE	AND	LANGUAGE	CONCORDANCE	ON	
PHYSICIAN	INCOME	
	 In	this	chapter,	I	outline	the	dependent	and	independent	variables	used	in	
the	econometric	analysis.	I	describe	the	econometric	model	and	the	different	types	
of	regressions	run	using	this	model.	An	explanation	of	why	different	models	are	
used	is	provided.		
	
		A.	Econometric	Model	to	Estimate	Physician	Income	
	 The	following	model	is	used	to	determine	the	effect	of	racial	and	language	
concordance	in	the	patient	physician	relationship	on	physician	income.	This	model	
was	formed	using	controls	similar	to	those	found	in	previous	research	(Cooper‐
Patrick	et	al.	1999;	LaViest	and	Nuru‐Jeter	2002;	Reyes	2007;	Shih	and	Konrad	
2007;	Weeks	and	Wallace	2006):	
	
ܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௫ሺܣܩܧ ൅ ܩܧܰܦܧܴ ൅ ܵܲܧܥܫܣܮܻܶ ൅ ܤܱܣܴܦܥܧܴܶܫܨܫܥܣܶܫܱܰ൅ ܴܲܣܥܶܫܥܧܻܶܲܧ ൅ ܪܱܷܴܵ ൅ ܱܹܰܧܴܵܪܫܲ ൅ ܸܫܵܫܶܵ ൅ܯܧܦܥܣܴܧ
൅ܯܧܦܥܣܫܦ ൅ ܥܣܲ ൅ ܤܱܷܰܵ ൅ ܲܣܴܶܣܥܧ ൅ ܦܱܥܴܣܥܧ ൅ ܥܷܮ
൅ ܮܣܰܩ ൅ ܫܰܶ ൅ ܤܦ ∗ ܤܲ ൅ ܪܦ ∗ ܪܲ ൅ ܣܦ ∗ ܣܲ ൅ ܮܣܰܩ ∗ ܤܦ
൅ ܮܣܰܩ ∗ ܪܦ ൅ ܮܣܰܩ ∗ ܣܦሻ ൅ 	ߝ	
	
Dependent	Variables	for	Physician	Income	
INCOME	 One	of	six	discrete	income	categories	the	physician	
belongs	to	
INCHOURS	 INCOME/HOURS,	the	approximate	hourly	wage	of	the	
physician	
PERFINCOME	 One	of	six	discrete	income	categories	the	physician	
belongs	to,	only	includes	physicians	who	have	a	
performance	based	aspect	to	their	income	
	
	
	
	13
Independent	Variables	for	Control	
	
	
AGE	 Time	since	the	physician	started	practicing	medicine	
Reference	group:	physicians	who	began	practicing	
before	1975	
	
EXP1	 1	if	physician	began	practicing	after	2005,	0	if	before	
EXP2	 1	if	physician	began	practicing	in	2001‐2004,	0	if	
otherwise	
EXP3	 1	if	physician	began	practicing	in	1996‐2000,	0	if	
otherwise	
EXP4	 1	if	physician	began	practicing	in	1991‐1995,	0	if	
otherwise	
EXP5	 1	if	physician	began	practicing	in	1986‐1990,	0	if	
otherwise	
EXP6	 1	if	physician	began	practicing	in	1981‐1985,	0	if	
otherwise	
EXP7	 1	if	physician	began	practicing	in	1976‐1980,	0	if	
otherwise	
	
GENDER	 Gender	of	physician	
Reference	group:	female	physicians	
	
MALE	 1	if	male	physician,	0	if	female	
	
SPECIALTY	 Type	of	specialty	training	the	physician	has	
Reference	group:	Medical	Specialties	
	
INTERNAL	 1	if	physician	specialized	in	internal	medicine,	0	if	
otherwise	
FAMILY	 1	if	physician	specialized	in	family	medicine,	0	if	
otherwise	
PEDIATRICS	 1	if	physician	specialized	in	pediatric	medicine,	0	if	
otherwise	
SURGICAL	 1	if	physician	specialized	in	surgical	medicine,	0	if	
otherwise	
PSYCH	 1	if	physician	specialized	in	psychiatric	medicine,	0	if	
otherwise	
OBGYN	 1	if	physician	specialized	in	obstetric/gynecologic	
medicine,	0	if	otherwise	
	
BOARDCERTIFICATION	 Whether	or	not	the	physician	is	board	certified	in	their	
specialty	
Reference	group:	Not	board	certified	
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BRD	 1	if	physician	board	certified,	0	if	not	
	
PRACTICETYPE	 Type	of	practice	the	physician	works	in	
	 	 	 	 Reference	group:	Solo/2	physician	practice	
	
GROUP	 1	if	the	physician	works	in	a	practice	with	3	or	more	
physicians,	0	if	otherwise	
HMO	 	 	 	 1	if	the	physician	works	in	an	HMO,	0	if	otherwise	
MEDSCHOOL	 1	if	the	physician	works	in	a	medical	school,	0	if	
otherwise	
HOSP	 	 	 	 1	if	the	physician	works	in	a	hospital,	0	if	otherwise	
OTHER	 1	if	the	physician	works	in	some	other	type	of	practice,	
0	if	in	a	previously	defined	practice	type	
	
HOURS	 	 	 Number	of	hours	the	physician	works	per	year	
	
OWNERSHIP	 	 	 Type	of	ownership	the	physician	has	in	his/her	practice	
	 	 	 	 Reference	group:	Full	owner	
	
POWN		 	 	 1	if	the	physician	is	a	partial	owner,	0	if	otherwise	
EMPLOY	 	 	 1	if	the	physician	is	an	employee,	0	if	otherwise	
ICONT	 1	if	the	physician	is	an	independent	contractor,	0	if	
otherwise	
	
VISITS	 Number	of	visits	physician	has	per	week	
	
VISCLINIC	 Number	of	clinic	visits	per	week	
VISHOSP	 Number	of	hospital	visits	per	week	
VISNURS	 Number	of	nursing	home	visits	per	week	
	
MEDCARE	 Percentage	of	payment	that	comes	from	Medicare	
patients	
	
MEDCAID	 Percentage	of	payment	that	comes	from	Medicaid	
patients	
	
CAP	 Percentage	of	payment	that	comes	from	capitation	or	
other	prospective	payment	system	
	
BONUS	 1	if	the	physician	earns	income	through	a	bonus,	0	if	not	
	
PATRACE	 Percentage	of	patients	that	are	of	a	particular	race	
	
BP	 Percentage	of	patients	that	are	Black	
HP	 Percentage	of	patients	that	are	Hispanic	
AP	 Percentage	of	patients	that	are	Asian	
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DOCRACE	 Physician	race	
	 Reference	group:	White	
	
BD	 1	if	physician	is	Black,	0	if	otherwise	
HD	 1	if	physician	is	Hispanic,	0	if	otherwise	
AD	 1	if	physician	is	Asian,	0	if	otherwise	
OD	 1	if	physician	is	a	race	not	specified,	0	if	race	is	one	of	
the	above	
	
Independent	Variables	Involved	in	Race	or	Language	Concordance	
	
CUL	 1	if	physician	has	cultural	competency	training,	0	if	not	
	
LANG	 Number	of	languages	(other	than	English)	that	the	
physician’s	patients	speak	
	
INT	 1	if	the	physician	uses	an	interpreter	service,	0	if	not	
	
Interaction	terms	
	
RACIAL	CONCORDANCE	
	
BDBP	 Interaction	between	Black	doctors	and	Black	patient	
percentage	
HDHP	 Interaction	between	Hispanic	doctors	and	Hispanic	
patient	percentage	
ADAP	 Interaction	between	Asian	doctors	and	Asian	patient	
percentage	
	
LANGUAGE	CONCORDANCE	
	
Black	Physician	 Interaction	between	number	of	languages	spoken	by	
patient	base	and	Black	physician	
	 Reference	group:	Black	physician,	all	English	patients	
	
BD_LANG_1	 1	if	Black	physician,	1	language	other	than	English	
spoken,	0	if	otherwise	
BD_LANG_2	 1	if	Black	physician,	2	languages	other	than	English	
spoken,	0	if	otherwise	
BD_LANG_3	 1	if	Black	physician,	3	languages	other	than	English	
spoken,	0	if	otherwise	
	
Hispanic	Physician	 Interaction	between	number	of	languages	spoken	by	
patient	base	and	Hispanic	physician	
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	 Reference	group:	Hispanic	physician,	all	English	
patients	
	
HD_LANG_1	 1	if	Hispanic	physician,	1	language	other	than	English	
spoken,	0	if	otherwise	
HD_LANG_2	 1	if	Hispanic	physician,	2	languages	other	than	English	
spoken,	0	if	otherwise	
HD_LANG_3	 1	if	Hispanic	physician,	3	languages	other	than	English	
spoken,	0	if	otherwise	
	
Asian	Physician	 Interaction	between	number	of	languages	spoken	by	
patient	base	and	Asian	physician	
	 Reference	group:	Asian	physician,	all	English	patients	
	
AD_LANG_1	 1	if	Asian	physician,	1	language	other	than	English	
spoken,	0	if	otherwise	
AD_LANG_2	 1	if	Asian	physician,	2	languages	other	than	English	
spoken,	0	if	otherwise	
AD_LANG_3	 1	if	Asian	physician,	3	languages	other	than	English	
spoken,	0	if	otherwise	
	
	
	 Three	dependent	variables	are	used	in	this	model.	All	three	are	different	
measures	of	physician	income.	The	first	is	INCOME,	a	variable	constructed	from	the	
dataset,	which	contains	six	categorical	annual	income	values.	These	income	
categories	range	from	the	lowest	being	“Under	$100,000”	to	the	highest	being	“Over	
$300,000,”	with	four	categories	separated	by	$50,000	in	between.	INCOME	takes	the	
average	of	each	of	the	categories	and	turns	them	into	dollar	values,	so	I	can	use	
Ordinary	Least	Squares	to	analyze	them.	The	INCOME	value	is	lower	bounded	at	
$80,000	and	upper	bounded	at	$350,000	in	effort	to	better	capture	the	average	
incomes	of	low	and	high	earning	physicians.	INCHOURS	is	INCOME	divided	by	
HOURS,	in	order	to	create	an	hourly	income	rate	for	physicians.	PERFINCOME	is	a	
dependent	variable	constructed	to	contain	those	physicians	who	had	a	
performance‐based	incentive	in	their	income,	with	the	same	values	as	INCOME.		
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	 		Many	of	the	independent	variables	have	been	chosen	as	controls	that	mirror	
those	used	in	previous	research.	Instead	of	using	age	or	experience	squared	as	an	
independent	variable	to	capture	the	decreasing	gains	in	income	as	physicians	age	
(Reyes	2007),	I	use	a	set	of	dummy	variables.	These	allow	for	the	same	occurrence	
to	be	captured	using	the	categorical	data	in	the	dataset.	The	longer	one	has	worked	
as	a	physician,	the	more	likely	he/she	is	to	be	higher	paid	(Shih	and	Konrad	2007).	
Thus,	I	expect	that	the	EXP	variables	will	result	in	negative	outcomes,	as	they	are	
referenced	against	the	longest	practicing	group.	Gender	is	another	important	
control,	as	studies	have	found	that	male	physicians	tend	to	have	higher	incomes	
than	female	physicians	(Cooper‐Patrick	et	al.	1999).	The	specialty	of	physicians	is	an	
important	factor	to	take	into	account,	as	physicians	with	different	specialties	have	
different	reimbursement	rates	and	salaries,	resulting	in	an	income	difference	
(Weeks	and	Wallace,	2006).	I	expect	that	physicians	with	more	specialized	practices	
such	as	surgery	and	psychiatry	to	have	higher	incomes	than	those	in	other	
specialties.		Board	certification	in	one’s	specialty	is	an	indicator	of	ability,	so	I	expect	
those	who	are	board	certified	to	have	higher	incomes	than	those	who	are	not	
(Reyes,	2007).	The	type	of	practice	that	a	physician	is	in	can	also	affect	income,	as,	
for	example,	those	in	hospital	or	group	practices	can	rely	on	nearby	referrals	or	
benefit	from	a	more	concentrated	patient	base	(Reyes,	2007).	The	number	of	hours	
that	a	physician	work	should	directly	correlate	to	their	income	as	those	who	work	
more	should	have	a	higher	annual	income.	The	ownership	in	the	practice	is	a	
variable	that	was	used	in	previous	research	to	indicate	incentives	(Weeks	and	
Wallace,	2006).	I	expect	that	those	who	have	full	or	part	ownership	will	have	high	
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incomes	than	employees	and	independent	contractors.	The	number	of	visits	that	a	
physician	has	a	week	and	where	those	visits	are	should	be,	similarly	to	hours,	
directly	correlated	to	income.	I	expect	that	physicians	with	more	visits	in	clinic	or	in	
a	hospital	to	make	more	than	those	who	have	more	nursing	home	visits.	Previous	
research	shows	that	physicians	who	have	more	Medicare	and	Medicaid	utilizing	
patients	tend	to	have	lower	incomes,	as	reimbursement	rates	are	lower	for	these	
insurers	than	private	insurance	(Reyes,	2007).	Thus,	I	expect	that	higher	
percentages	of	Medicare	and	Medicaid	patients	will	result	in	lower	incomes	for	
physicians.	Similar	to	Medicare	and	Medicaid,	prospective	payment	systems	like	
capitation	result	in	the	physician	making	fewer	profits	(Reyes,	2007).	I	expect	a	
higher	percentage	of	prospective	payment	to	result	in	lower	incomes	for	physicians.	
The	bonus	independent	variable	also	acts	as	an	indicator	for	ability	and	incentives,	
and	I	expect	those	who	are	paid	extra	with	bonuses	will	enjoy	higher	incomes.		
	 The	variables	I	am	interested	in	analyzing	begin	with	patient	race.	Minority	
populations	are	outlined	in	previous	research	as	having	lower	incomes	as	well	as	
healthcare	utilization	(Burgess	et	al.	2008).	It	follows	that	I	expect	physicians	who	
have	a	higher	minority	patient	base,	holding	all	else	constant,	to	have	lower	
incomes.	The	race	of	physicians	is	also	a	variable	of	interest.	I	use	dummy	variables	
to	distinguish	between	White,	Black,	Hispanic,	Asian,	and	other	doctors.	Again,	as	
minority	populations	have	been	shown	to	have	lower	incomes,	I	expect	Hispanic,	
Black,	Asian,	and	other	doctors	to	have	lower	incomes	than	the	reference	group,	
White	physicians.	These	variables	allow	us	to	control	the	race	related	interaction	
terms	in	the	model.	
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	 When	looking	at	controlling	language,	the	data	offer	us	three	different	
variables.	The	cultural	competency	variable	shows	whether	or	not	cultural	
competency	training	has	been	undertaken	by	the	physician.	Due	to	the	constraints	
of	the	data	set,	we	do	not	know	if	this	training	is	a	punishment	from	being	culturally	
incompetent,	or	an	extra	training	program	for	physicians	who	have	a	culturally	
diverse	patient	base.	If	this	is	a	punitive	measure,	it	would	seem	that	the	physicians	
who	had	to	undergo	the	training	would	have	lower	incomes,	as	they	are	not	as	
effective	at	communicating	as	those	who	did	not	have	to	undergo	the	training.	
However,	if	it	is	an	extra	measure,	it	could	be	that	the	physicians	who	have	
undergone	the	training	are	more	effective	at	communicating	with	their	patient	base,	
and	thus	more	likely	to	enjoy	higher	incomes.	I	expect	that	this	is	the	case,	and	
cultural	competency	leads	to	higher	physician	income.	The	next	interesting	variable	
is	LANG,	or	the	number	of	languages	that	the	patient	base	speaks.	The	more	variable	
the	patient’s	languages	are,	the	less	likely	that	the	physician	can	communicate	
efficiently	with	all	of	them	(Brown	et	al.	2007).	Thus,	I	expect	that	having	a	more	
linguistically	diverse	patient	population	will	lead	to	lower	incomes	for	physicians.	
The	INT	variable	is	a	binary	variable	that	shows	whether	or	not	physicians	utilize	an	
interpreter	service.	As	this	would	increase	patient‐physician	communication,	I	
expect	that	having	an	interpreter	will	increase	physician	income	(LaViest	and	Nuru‐
Jeter	2002).		
	 The	interaction	terms	of	interest	begin	with	the	racial	concordance	
interaction.	The	variables	BDBP,	HDHP,	and	ADAP	capture	the	racial	concordance	
amongst	Black,	Hispanic,	and	Asian	physician‐patient	pairs.		
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߲ܻ
߲ܤܲ ൌ ߚ஻௉ ൅ ߚ஻௉஻஽ ∙ ܤܦ		
This	example	partial	derivative	shows	the	partial	derivative	of	income	over	the	
percentage	of	black	patients.	When	solved,	this	equation	will	give	the	coefficient	of	
percentage	of	black	patients	plus	the	coefficient	of	the	interaction	between	black	
patients	and	physicians	and	the	variable	of	whether	or	not	the	physician	is	black.	If	
the	physician	is	not	black,	I	simply	get	ߚ஻௉,	as	BD=0.	If	the	physician	is	black,	
however,	I	get	a	value	for	ߚ஻௉஻஽.	If	this	value	is	positive,	racial	concordance	
promotes	higher	income	in	black	patient‐physician	relationships.	If	negative,	the	
concordance	leads	to	a	lower	income.	A	similar	analysis	works	for	Hispanic	and	
Asian	pairs.		
	 In	terms	of	language	concordance,	the	data	set	offers	us	only	the	number	of	
languages	the	patient	base	speaks.	Thus,	the	language	interactions	BD_LANG,	
HD_LANG,	and	AD_LANG	have	been	split	into	dummy	variables.	The	dummy	
variables	allow	us	to	look	at	whether	or	not	income	rises	in	a	given	race	of	
physicians	if	their	patients	mostly	speak	more	languages	than	just	English.	I	expect	
that	Black	doctors	have	decreasing	incomes	with	more	diverse	patient	bases,	as	the	
Black	culture	does	not	have	one	specific	language	(Brown	et	al.	2007).	I	expect	the	
Hispanic	physicians	to	increase	in	income	if	their	patients	speak	one	language	other	
than	English,	with	the	assumption	that	this	language	is	Spanish	(Brown	et	al.	2007).	
However,	as	the	patient	population	diversifies	for	Hispanic	doctors,	I	expect	the	
same	communication	issues	as	for	White	and	Black	physicians	to	lower	income.		As	
the	Asian	ethnicity	is	very	broad	and	contains	cultures	with	hundreds	of	different	
languages,	I	expect,	contrary	to	the	findings	of	Brown	et	al.	(2007)	that	more	
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languages	will	decrease	physician	income.	With	more	specific	ethnicities	and	patient	
races,	I	could	look	at	more	specific	interaction	terms	for	languages,	which	would	
help	with	the	Asian	physician/patient	case.		
	
B.	Estimation	tools	
	 This	analysis	uses	ordinary	least	squares	(OLS)	and	ordered	probit	analysis	
to	solve	the	econometric	model.	OLS	results	have	a	bias	as	the	dependent	variable,	
income,	is	recorded	in	categories	in	the	ICSPR	survey.	Thus,	I	take	a	discrete	
variable	and	assigned	each	category	a	numerical	value	to	view	the	results	as	if	the	
dependent	variable	was	continuous.	In	order	to	try	and	remove	this	bias,	I	also	used	
ordered	probit	analysis.		
	 Ordered	probit	analysis	is	used	when	there	is	a	discrete	dependent	variable	
with	more	than	two	possible	outcomes.	In	this	case,	I	have	six	income	categories,	
and	therefore	ordered	probit	is	required.	As	we	cannot	treat	these	categories	as	
cardinal	numbers,	we	treat	them	as	ordered	categories.	Ordered	probit	is	a	
maximum	likelihood	estimation	technique.	It	makes	the	assumption	that	the	
categories	for	the	dependent	variable	follow	a	normal	cumulative	distribution	
function.	Thus,	given	the	independent	variables,	it	can	predict	how	increases	and	
decreases	in	independent	variables	will	affect	the	probability	of	the	dependent	
variable	being	in	a	certain	category.	This	measurement	is	more	accurate	than	using	
OLS	in	this	study,	as	the	OLS	required	manually	calculated	dollar	values	for	the	
income	categories.	The	ordered	probit	utilizes	the	cumulative	distribution	function	
to	assume	a	normal	function	of	income	values	throughout	the	dependent	variable,	
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creating	a	more	likely	scenario(Stata	Annotated	Output	Probit	Regression,	accessed	
2012).	Using	the	“margins”	command	in	Stata,	I	am	able	to	calculate	the	marginal	
effects	of	each	of	the	dependent	variables,	which	can	be	interpreted	as	the	
probability	of	a	unit	change	in	the	variable	resulting	in	a	change	in	category	(Stata	
Annotated	Output	Probit	Regression,	accessed	2012).		The	model	does,	however,	
have	its	own	error,	and	is	not	as	accurate	as	if	I	had	continuous	data.	
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CHAPTER	FOUR	
DESCRIPTION	OF	THE	2008	HEALTH	TRACKING	PHYSICIAN	SURVEY	
In	Chapter	four,	I	describe	the	2008	Healthy	Tracking	Physician	survey,	from	which	
the	data	were	obtained.	I	also	explain	the	descriptive	statistics	for	the	used	dataset.	
	
A.	2008	Health	Tracking	Physician	Survey	Explanation	
	 The	2008	Health	Tracking	Physician	Survey	(HTPS)	is	a	cross‐sectional	
dataset	used	in	this	study.	It	is	part	of	the	Community	Tracking	Study	series,	funded	
by	the	Robert	Wood	Johnson	Foundation	and	conducted	by	the	Center	for	Studying	
Health	System	Change.	The	dataset	was	retrieved	from	the	Inter‐University	
Consortium	for	Political	and	Social	Research	(ICPSR).		
	 The	2008	HTPS	was	administered	nationally	to	physicians	directly	involved	
in	patient	care	and	obtained	data	on	physician	characteristics.	The	survey	included	
physicians	who	worked	for	over	20	hours	per	week,	and	excluded	federal	
employees,	foreign	medical	school	graduates	who	did	not	have	US	licenses,	graduate	
medical	students	(interns,	residents,	and	fellows),	and	physicians	who	were	not	
directly	involved	in	patient	care.	The	survey	respondents	were	selected	with	
stratified	random	sampling	with	20	strata,	and	the	list	of	physicians	was	provided	
from	the	American	Medical	Association	masterfile.	The	survey	was	a	mail	
questionnaire,	and	includes	probability	weight	which	adjusts	for	bias	created	from	
nonresponse	and	probability	of	selection.	The	2008	HTPS	also	contains	a	restricted	
data	set	which	includes	geographic	information	as	well	as	a	continuous	income	
indicator,	however,	this	was	not	available	to	the	public.	
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B.	Descriptive	Statistics	
	 The	complete	2008	HTPS	contains	survey	responses	from	4,720	physicians.	
Table	1	(p.	37)	shows	the	descriptive	statistics	for	the	dataset	used.	The	responses	
for	questions	used	in	the	construction	of	the	cultural	competency,	language,	
interpreter,	bonus,	hours,	and	board	certification	had	missing	values,	thus	reducing	
the	total	number	of	used	observations	for	the	annual	income	to	and	the	hourly	wage	
to	4,043.	To	determine	if	performance	based	incentives	played	a	part	in	the	income,	
a	subset	of	1,802	observations	with	performance	paid	physicians	was	used	as	well.	
	 The	average	income	for	physicians	in	this	sample	set	was	slightly	over	
$200,000,	or	approximately	$90/hour.	The	performance	paid	physicians	had	a	
higher	average	income	of	just	over	$216,000.	The	average	patient	breakdown	was	
14.97%	Black,	13.85%	Hispanic,	and	4.70%	Asian.	The	physicians	were	mostly	
White.	On	average,	the	physicians	were	not	culturally	competence	trained,	had	a	
patient	base	that	spoke	1	language	other	than	English,	and	had	an	interpreter	
service.	Black,	Hispanic,	and	Asian	physicians	had,	on	average,	about	a	1%	racially	
concordant	patient	base.	In	terms	of	language,	Asian	and	Hispanic	physicians	were	
more	likely	to	have	linguistically	diverse	populations.		
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CHAPTER	FIVE	
REGRESSION	RESULTS:	RACIAL	AND	LANGUAGE	CONCORDANCE	AS	A	
DETERMINANT	OF	PHYSICIAN	INCOME	
	 In	Chapter	five,	I	discuss	the	regression	results	for	this	analysis.	The	first	
section	includes	the	relationship	between	annual	income	and	the	independent	
variables.		In	the	second	section,	I	describe	the	income	in	hourly	terms,	and,	in	the	
third,	I	use	annual	income	and	a	performance	paid	physician	subset.		
	
A.	Regression	Analysis	for	Annual	Income	
	 The	first	set	of	regression	results	I	report	on	have	annual	income	as	the	
dependent	variable.	Table	2	(p.40)	shows	the	coefficients	for	3	OLS	and	1	ordered	
probit	model	regressions.	
	 	The	first	OLS	regression	in	the	first	column	of	Table	2	(p.40)	is	a	simpler	
version	of	the	original	model,	without	language	interaction	considered.	Thus,	it	
measures	only	racial	concordance	rather	than	racial	and	language	concordance.	The	
first	control,	experience,	shows	results	contrary	to	expectations.	The	only	negative	
value	is	for	the	least	experienced	physicians,	who,	according	to	the	results,	earn	less	
than	the	reference	group	on	average	holding	all	else	constant,	which	is	the	most	
experienced	physicians.	This	is	a	non	significant	result,	however,	and	may	be	
because	there	are	a	small	percentage	of	physicians	in	the	tail	end	groups.	The	
highest	income	bracket	is	the	physicians	who	began	practicing	in	1991‐1995.	This	
could	be	a	result	of	aging	physicians	working	less,	or	moving	to	less	intense	
specialties.		As	expected,	the	male	gender	earns	more	than	females,	which	is	
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consistent	with	Cooper‐Patrick	et	al.	(1999)	and	Reyes	(2007).	In	terms	of	
specialties,	Surgical	and	Medical	specialties	earn	the	most	while	Family	and	
Pediatric	specialties	earn	the	least,	on	average	holding	all	else	constant.	This	is	
another	expected	result,	as	the	more	intense	specialties	earn	more	(Shih	and	
Konrad,	2007).	Board	certification,	as	expected,	led	to	higher	incomes	for	physicians	
as	well.	In	terms	of	practice	organization,	solo	practitioners	had	the	lowest	income	
on	average	holding	all	else	constant,	with	hospital	workers	having	the	highest.	For	
every	hour	worked,	physicians	earned	$11.51	extra	on	average	holding	all	else	
constant.	This	is	a	smaller	number	than	expected,	possibly	because	the	number	of	
hours	physicians	work	matter	less	than	the	complexity	and	number	of	cases	they	
see.	Full	ownership	of	a	practice	earned	physicians	less	than	partial	ownership,	
though	more	than	both	being	an	employee	or	independent	contractor.	This	is	again	
likely	because	those	in	a	group	practice	are	more	specialized,	while	practice	owners	
are	more	like	solo	and	in	primary	care.	The	results	also	show	that	hospital	visits	pay	
more	than	clinic	visits,	likely	because	these	visits	are	more	complicated	and	
reimburse	more.	Though	the	values	for	Nursing	home	visits,	Medicare,	Medicaid,	
and	prospective	form	payments	were	insignificant,	they	had	a	negative	value.	This	is	
likely	because	the	more	nursing	home,	or	Medicare/Medicaid/capitation	visits	a	
physician	has,	the	less	time	they	have	for	higher	reimbursing	patients.	Bonus	
eligibility	positively	affects	income,	as	per	expectations.	Similar	to	how	Cooper‐
Patrick	et	al.	(1999)	and	Saha	et	al.	(1999)	reported,	higher	percentages	of	Black	
and	Hispanic	patients	negatively	affected	physician	income.	This	could	be	a	result	of	
lower	incomes	or	lower	utilization	in	the	minorities.	An	increase	in	Asian	patients,	
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unexpectedly,	led	to	an	average	increase	in	income	holding	all	else	constant,	though	
this	result	was	non‐significant.	All	results	for	race	of	physician	are	non	significant,	
though	they	predicted	significantly	lower	incomes	for	Black,	Hispanic,	and	Other	
physicians	in	comparison	to	White	and	Asian	physicians.	Cultural	competency	
training	has	a	significant	and	large	negative	impact	on	physician	income,	suggesting	
that	it	indicates	physicians	who	cannot	properly	communicate	with	their	patients,	
rather	than	those	who	are	willing	to	go	the	extra	mile	to	communicate	better.	The	
number	of	non	English	languages	that	patients	spoke	unexpectedly	increased	
physician	income,	though	the	effect	was	non	significant.	The	interpreter	service	
greatly	increased	physician	income,	and	was	significant.	This	could	suggest	that	
those	with	interpreter	service	are	able	to	cater	better	to	more	linguistically	diverse	
patients,	giving	them	a	premium	in	incomes	as	number	of	languages	increases.	The	
racial	concordance	terms	for	all	three	races	were	non	significant,	though	Black	and	
Hispanic	pairs	had	positive	values	and	Asian	pairs	had	a	negative	effect	on	income.		
	 The	second	OLS,	in	the	second	column	of	Table	2	(p.40)	was	created	to	
determine	whether	or	not	interpreter	was	an	endogenous	variable.	It	was	assumed	
possible	that	those	physicians	who	have	higher	incomes	are	better	able	to	hire	
interpreter	services.	However,	as	I	can	see	from	the	regression,	all	values	of	
variables	are	similar	to	OLS	1,	except	that	the	interpreter	service	seems	to	be	
expressed	in	the	language	variable,	which	is	now	larger	and	significant.	This	
suggests	that	the	interpreter	service	is	not	endogenous,	but	indeed	necessary.	These	
results	reflect	the	findings	of	Brach	and	Fraserirector	(2000),	who	suggested	that	
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most	interpreter	services	are	volunteer	or	reimbursable,	so	they	are	not	affected	by	
physician	income.		
	 The	third	column	of	Table	2	(p.40)	includes	the	language	interaction	
dummies	for	physician	patient	relationships.	The	findings	for	the	control	variables	
are	very	similar	to	OLS	1,	though	in	this	regression.	For	language	concordance,	the	
results	are	non	significant.	Black	physicians	experienced	the	largest	negative	impact	
when	their	patients	spoke	one	language	other	than	English.	When	patients	spoke	
three	or	more	non‐English	languages,	the	negative	impact	was	much	lower.	This	
could	be	because,	as	patients	become	more	diversified,	physicians	are	more	
incentivized	(or	required)	to	hire	an	interpreter,	etc.,	to	better	communicate	with	
their	patients.	Also,	those	physicians	who	have	a	wider	linguistic	patient	base	may	
have	better	language	and	communications	themselves,	leading	to	all	sorts	of	
patients	choosing	them	over	other	physicians.		For	Hispanic	physicians,	income	
actually	rises	by	a	large	portion	when	the	patients	speak	one	language	other	than	
English,	but	falls	like	the	others	when	the	patients	speak	two	or	three.	Asian	
physicians	have	a	negative	impact	regardless	of	how	many	languages	patients	speak	
other	than	English.	
	 The	final	column	of	Table	2	(p.40)	is	the	ordered	probit	analysis	of	the	annual	
income.	The	ordered	probit	analysis	is	required	because	of	the	discrete	nature	of	the	
dependent	variable.	The	coefficients	given	are	not	read	in	dollar	amounts	like	the	
OLS	estimates,	but	rather	ordered	log‐odds	estimates.	Thus,	for	example,	if	a	
physician	began	his	or	her	practice	in	2001‐2005,	their	ordered	log‐odds	of	being	in	
a	higher	income	category	than	those	who	began	before	1975	would	increase	by	
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0.232,	on	average	holding	all	other	variables	constant.	Thus,	a	positive	value	
indicates	a	higher	probability	of	being	in	a	higher	income	category	with	a	unit	
increase	in	the	variable,	whereas	a	negative	value	is	an	increased	probability	of	
being	in	a	lower	category.	The	cut	points	in	Table	2	(p.40)	show	the	values	for	the	
different	categories	with	null	values	in	the	variables.	Thus,	if	a	physician	had	null	
values	for	all	variables	and	a	latent	variable	value	between	1.206	(Cut	2)	and	1.903	
(Cut	3)	would	be	in	income	category	3,	$150,000‐$200,000	annual	income.		(Stata	
Annotated	Output	Probit	Regression,	accessed	2012).	The	ordered	probit	results	are	
similar	to	that	of	the	OLS.	
	
B.	Regression	Analysis	for	Hourly	Wage		
		 In	order	to	obtain	more	variety	using	the	categorical	variables,	I	also	divided	
annual	income	by	hours	worked	to	find	average	hourly	wage	and	if	it	is	affected	by	
racial	and	language	concordance.	Table	3	(p.	44)	shows	the	results	of	this	analysis,	
with	three	columns	of	OLS	regressions.	Ordered	probit	was	not	conducted	on	this	
set	of	variables	because	they	were	treated	as	continuous.		
	 The	first	column	of	Table	3	(p.	44)	shows	the	simple	model	OLS	regression	
with	income	in	hourly	wage	rather	than	annual.	This	regression	has	very	similar	
results	to	the	second	column,	which	once	again	removed	interpreter	services	from	
the	regression	model.	Though	the	significance	and	general	values	of	the	control	
variables	were	the	same	as	those	illustrated	in	Table	2	(p.40),	this	regression	
showed	interesting	results	for	racial	and	language	concordance.	Unlike	with	yearly	
wage,	Black	and	Hispanic	physician‐patient	pairings	had	positive	(though	non	
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significant)	values	for	hourly	wage.	This	could	mean	that	Black	and	Hispanic	
physicians	tended	to	work	fewer	hours	a	year,	but	do	have	positive	effect	from	racial	
concordance	at	an	hourly	rate.	Asian	physician	patient	pairings	still	have	a	negative	
value.		
The	third	column	of	Table	3	(p.	44)	reintroduced	language	concordance	
interactions.	Though	insignificant,	there	are	two	interesting	positive	values	for	
coefficients.	In	terms	of	language	concordance,	Hispanic	physicians	still	gain	an	
hourly	premium	for	treating	patients	who	speak	1	language	other	than	English,	and,	
at	an	hourly	rate,	Asian	physicians	show	a	similar	positive	value	for	patients	who	
speak	1	non‐English	language.	Again,	it	is	possible	that	Asian	physicians	work	fewer	
hours	at	a	higher	rate	with	these	patients,	putting	a	premium	on	language	
concordance.			
	
C.	Regression	analysis	for	Performance‐based	Income	
	 Looking	at	income	may	not	give	us	the	whole	picture,	as	some	physicians	
may	simply	work	more	or	less	hours,	skewing	the	results.	Thus,	Table	4	(p.	48)	uses	
a	subset	of	physicians	whose	salaries	are	determined	with	performance	based	
incentives.	Thus,	those	who	are	better	at	communicating	will	have	higher	incomes,	
as	their	patients	will	have	better	health	outcomes	and	satisfaction	(LaViest	and	
Nuru‐Jeter,	2002).		
	 Column	1	of	Table	4	(p.	48)	starts	off	with	the	simpler	model	used	in	the	first	
columns	of	previous	regression	tables,	and	has	similar	results	to	column	2	of	Table	4	
(p.	48),	the	regression	without	interpreter.		The	only	control	variable	that	changes	
	31
relative	to	the	previous	two	regression	models	is	that	full	ownership	of	a	practice	is	
more	beneficial	than	part	ownership,	likely	because	those	who	own	a	practice	and	
pay	themselves	by	performance	of	the	practice	can	get	a	hefty	bonus.	In	this	case,	
though	insignificant,	the	positive	values	suggest	Hispanic	physicians,	Asian	
physicians,	and	Other	physicians	are	paid	more	than	White	physicians	and	Black	
physicians.	This	is	a	positive	result	for	our	analysis,	as	it	is	those	physicians	who	are	
most	likely	to	have	language	concordance	with	non‐English	speakers	who	have	
higher	incomes,	on	average	holding	all	else	constant.	In	this	regression,	the	incomes	
of	physicians	drop	as	number	of	their	multilingual	speaking	patients	increases.	This	
is	also	expected,	as,	according	to	Table	1	(p.	37),	the	large	majority	of	physicians	are	
White,	and	are	therefore	assumed	to	be	less	fluent	than	ethnic	physicians	in	other	
languages.	The	racial	concordance	interactions	show	that	Black	physician	and	
patient	pairs	still	add	a	premium	to	physician	income,	though	Hispanic	physician	
patient	pairs	now	negatively	effect	income,	though	these	numbers	are	non	
significant.		
In	terms	of	language	concordance,	I	can	see	from	column	3	of	Table	4	(p.	48)	
that,	as	the	number	of	languages	spoken	by	their	patients	increase,	Black	and	Asian	
physician	incomes	rise,	while	Hispanic	physicians	incomes	fall.	This	could	again	be	a	
function	of	the	language	that	the	Hispanic	physicians	speak,	rather	than	those	of	the	
patients.			 	
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CHAPTER	SIX	
DISCUSSION	AND	CONCLUSIONS	
A.	Summary	of	Results	
	 This	study	takes	2008	ICPSR	Health	Tracking	Physician	Survey	data	and	uses	
it	to	examine	the	effect	of	racial	and	language	concordance	in	the	physician‐patient	
relationship	and	its	effect	on	physician	income.	Previous	research	is	expanded	on	by	
attempting	to	discover	if	language	concordance	is	the	cause	of	the	premium	paid	to	
physicians	in	racially	concordant	relationships.	
	 This	study	does	not	support	the	hypothesis	that	racial	and	language	
concordance	positively	effect	physician	income	in	the	physician	patient	relationship.	
Due	to	lack	of	significance,	though	some	variables	had	similar	positive/negative	
signs	as	those	expected,	I	could	not	reject	the	null	hypothesis.	From	the	insignificant	
results	that	were	obtained,	racial	concordance	is	shown	to	have	a	positive	effect	on	
income	with	Black	and	Hispanic	physician‐patient	pairs,	but	not	Asian.	This	could	be	
attributed	to	the	fact	that,	while	Black	and	Hispanic	cultures	are	more	specific,	the	
Asian	title	has	subcultures	that	are	as	dissimilar	within	themselves	as	they	are	to	
other	cultures.	Thus,	though	the	race	is	defined	as	the	same,	the	pair	does	not	
benefit	from	communication	improvements	Cooper‐Patrick	et	al.	(1999)	would	
suggest.	The	study	found	that	cultural	competency	training	was	a	negative	
contributor	to	income,	suggesting	that	cultural	competency	training	is	used	when	
physicians	have	been	proven	to	have	poor	communication	skills,	and	need	
improvement	already.	Interpreter	services	was	a	large	positive	contributor	to	
income.	This	suggests	that	physicians	who	are	willing	to	try	to	find	interpreter	
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services	for	their	patients	are	likely	to	receive	an	income	premium.	It	could	also	be	
that	the	use	of	the	interpreter	service	draws	patients	from	other	competitors	to	
their	practice,	rather	than	better	communication	with	those	patients.	For	language	
concordance,	the	null	hypothesis	could	not	be	rejected.	Trends	in	the	results	showed	
that	income	should	increase	when	physicians	have	either	all	English	speaking	
patients,	or	patients	with	a	wide	variety	of	languages.	This	can	be	explained	by	
physicians	who	have	all	English	patients	not	needing	to	become	culturally	
competent	or	hire	interpreter	services,	and	having	perfect	communication	
regardless.	Physicians	who	may	be	multi	lingual	themselves	or	be	open	to	more	
cultures	and	therefore	more	keen	on	proper	communication	may	find	themselves	
having	a	more	varied	patient	base,	keeping	their	income	high.		
	
B.	Policy	Implications	
	 Several	policy	implications	can	be	gleaned	from	this	study	and	possible	
future	research.	First	and	foremost,	I	have	found	a	strong	positive	relationship	
between	the	use	of	interpreter	services	and	physician	income.	If	physicians	were	
pushed	to	utilize	more	available	communications	tools	such	as	these,	physicians	
would	enjoy	an	increase	in	income	while	patients	would	enjoy	better	health	
outcomes	(Brach	and	Fraserirector,	2000).	Cultural	competency	programs	that	are	
aimed	at	improving	communication	and	understanding	should	also	become	a	part	of	
undergraduate	or	graduate	medical	training,	rather	than	an	optional	or	punitive	
action.	This	way,	all	physicians	will	be	able	to	better	communicate	with	a	variety	of	
patients	and	enjoy	a	more	diverse	patient	base	as	well	as	offer	more	choice	for	
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minority	patients.	This	cultural	competency	training	could	also	involve	medical	
beliefs	and	behaviors	that	are	common	in	other	cultures,	further	specifying	
healthcare	information	for	patients.	Overall,	the	study	shows	that	gains	can	be	seen	
from	the	physician	side	as	well	as	for	patients	when	physicians	are	more	aware	or	
immersed	in	culture,	and	policy	should	be	made	to	reflect	that.		
	
C.	Further	Research	Opportunities	
	
	 This	study	is	conducted	with	a	limited	data	set	that	had	survey	bias,	sample	
selection	bias,	and	censored	data.	If	further	research	could	be	done	to	more	
accurately	explore	this	hypothesis,	several	changes	would	need	to	be	made.	First,	
physician	income	should	be	continuous,	allowing	for	more	specific	information.	The	
language	variable	should	include	the	languages	that	the	physician	speaks	as	well	as	
the	specific	languages	their	patients	speak,	allowing	the	researcher	to	construct	a	
more	accurate	interaction	term	without	using	the	assumption	in	this	study.	Similar	
to	the	Brown	et	al.	(2007)	study,	geographic	data	should	be	included	in	the	study.	
This	will	allow	the	researcher	to	determine	the	kinds	of	cultures	that	permeate	the	
market	in	which	the	physician	is	located,	ruling	out	some	serendipity	in	the	choices	
of	patients	and	their	physicians.	Also,	physicians	are	not	the	only	members	of	staff	
that	can	communicate	with	or	deal	with	patients.	Further	studies	should	look	at	
whether	or	not	physicians	hire	multicultural	staff	to	help	acclimatize	minority	
patients,	involve	family	members	to	facilitate	communication,	or	consult	with	
traditional	healers	to	better	understand	minority	patient	practices	(Brach	and	
Fraserirector	2000).		
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Table	1.	Descriptive	statistics	for	dependent	and	independent	variables	used	in	
analysis	
	
Variable	 Mean	 Min	 Max	
Income	Measurements	 	
Annual	Income	 203765.90(90570.39) 80000	 350000
Hourly	Income	 90.12(49.15) 19.231	 673.077
Performance	based	Income	 216097.90(90524.13) 80000	 350000
Experience	 	
Beginning	year	of	practice	after	2005	 0.05(0.22) 0	 1
Beginning	year	of	practice	2001‐2004	 0.12(0.34) 0	 1
Beginning	year	of	practice	1996‐2000	 0.17(0.38) 0	 1
Beginning	year	of	practice	1991‐1995	 0.14(0.35) 0	 1
Beginning	year	of	practice	1986‐1990	 0.15(0.36) 0	 1
Beginning	year	of	practice	1981‐1985	 0.14(0.35) 0	 1
Beginning	year	of	practice	1976‐1980	 0.10(0.30) 0	 1
Gender	 	
Male	 0.73(0.44) 0	 1
Specialty	 	
Internal	Medicine	 0.13(0.34) 0	 1
Family	Medicine	 0.17(0.38) 0	 1
Pediatric	Medicine	 0.09(0.29) 0	 1
Surgical	Medicine	 0.19(0.39) 0	 1
Psychiatric	Medicine	 0.07(0.25) 0	 1
Obstetric/Gynecologic	Medicine	 0.06(0.25) 0	 1
Certification	 	
Board	Certification	 0.90(0.30) 0	 1
Type	of	Practice	 	
Group	Practice	 0.39(0.49) 0	 1
	38
HMO	 0.03(0.18) 0	 1
Medical	School	 0.07(0.26) 0	 1
Hospital	 0.12(0.33) 0	 1
Other	 0.04(0.20) 0	 1
Time	Worked	 	
Hours	 2425.81(734.47) 1	 4160
Ownership	in	Practice	 	
Partial	Ownership	 0.26(0.44) 0	 1
Employee	 0.38(0.49) 0	 1
Independent	Contractor	 0.047(0.21) 0	 1
Visits	per	week	 	
Clinic	Visits	 67.97(38.85) 0	 150
Hospital	Visits	 13.34(19.67) 0	 70
Nursing	Home	Visits	 0.77(2.47) 0	 10
Types	of	Reimbursement	 	
Percentage	of	Medicare	reimbursement	 31.18(22.94) 0	 100
	
Percentage	of	Medicaid	reimbursement	
16.73
(20.39) 0	 100
	
Percentage	of	prospective	payment	
reimbursement	
11.68
(22.64) 0	 100
Bonus	eligibility		 0.45(0.50) 0	 1
Race	of	patients	 	
Percentage	of	Black	patients	 14.97(14.71) 0	 51
Percentage	of	Hispanic	patients	 13.85(14.42) 0	 51
Percentage	of	Asian	patients	 4.69(6.14) 0	 26
Race	of	Physician	 	
Hispanic	physician	 0.052(0.22) 0	 1
Black	physician	 0.035(0.18) 0	 1
Asian	physician	 0.14(0.35) 0	 1
	39
Other	physician	 0.01(0.11) 0	 1
Language	parameters	 	
Cultural	competency	training	 0.39(0.49) 0	 1
Number	of	non‐English	languages	patients	
speak	
0.89
(1.08) 0	 3
Interpreter	service	 0.55(0.50) 0	 1
Racial	Concordance	 	
Black	physician/patient	interaction	 1.19(7.06) 0	 51
Hispanic	physician/patient	interaction	 1.37(7.33) 0	 51
Asian	physician/patient	interaction	 1.19(4.39) 0	 26
Language	Concordance	 	
Black	physician,	1	non‐English	language	
spoken	by	patients	
0.01
(0.08) 0	 1
	
Black	physician,	2	non‐English	languages	
spoken	by	patients	
0.01
(0.06) 0	 1
	
Black	physician,	3	non‐English	languages	
spoken	by	patients	
0.01
(0.08) 0	 1
	
Hispanic	physician,	1	non‐English	
language	spoken	by	patients	
0.01
(0.12) 0	 1
	
Hispanic	physician,	2	non‐English	
languages	spoken	by	patients	
0.01
(0.07) 0	 1
	
Hispanic	physician,	3	non‐English	
languages	spoken	by	patients	
0.01
(0.09) 0	 1
	
Asian	physician,	1	non‐English	language	
spoken	by	patients	
0.03
(0.19) 0	 1
	
Asian	physician,	2	non‐English	languages	
spoken	by	patients	
0.01
(0.12) 0	 1
	
Asian	physician,	3	non‐English	languages	
spoken	by	patients	
0.02
(0.15) 0	 1
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________	
Observations	 	 	 	 	 	 4,043	
	 	
Note:	Standard	deviations	are	presented	in	parentheses	
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Table	2.	Regression	results	for	Annual	Income	
	
		 OLS	1 OLS	2 OLS	3	 Ordered	probit
Dependent	Variable:	
Income	
		 		
Experience	
Beginning	year	of	practice	
after	2005	 ‐5,511.35	 ‐5,410.9	 ‐5,040.61	 ‐0.062	
(6,730.78) (6,752.99) (6,746.67)	 (‐0.103)
Beginning	year	of	practice	
2001‐2004	 13,147.39**	 13,170.75**	 13,174.48**	 0.232**	
(5,330.24) (5,331.64) (5,334.92)	 (0.082)
Beginning	year	of	practice	
1996‐2000	 27,644.20***	 27,619.43***	 27,575.03***	 0.42**	
(4,947.12) (4,954.75) (4,948.49)	 (0.076)
Beginning	year	of	practice	
1991‐1995	 33,609.68***	 33,512.31***	 33,791.17***	 0.526**	
(5,123.59) (5,131.03) (5,127.55)	 (0.078)
Beginning	year	of	practice	
1986‐1990	 27,117.84***	 27,128.50***	 27,095.52***	 0.426**	
(5,006.43) (5,014.41) (5,006.63)	 (0.076)
Beginning	year	of	practice	
1981‐1985	 22,513.99***	 22,386.53***	 22,425.80***	 0.345**	
(5,122.39) (5,129.86) (5,127.48)	 (0.079)
Beginning	year	of	practice	
1976‐1980	 19,345.66***	 18,894.04***	 19,122.79***	 0.305**	
(5,463.13) (5,454.45) (5,462.10)	 (0.083)
Gender	
Male	 33,789.18***	 33,944.25***	 33,779.12***	 0.531**	
(2,776.42) (2,776.38) (2,777.44)	 (0.042)
Specialty	
Internal	Medicine	 ‐64,882.94***	 ‐64,913.13***	 ‐64,720.41***	 ‐0.91**	
(3,931.95) (3,929.61) (3,940.51)	 (0.060)
Family	Medicine	 ‐74,556.14***	 ‐74,674.50***	 ‐74,603.70***	 ‐1.079**	
(3,853.05) (3,858.46) (3,859.18)	 (0.060)
Pediatric	Medicine	 ‐71,552.54***	 ‐72,029.08***	 ‐71,603.58***	 ‐1.074**	
(4,782.27) (4,784.85) (4,774.48)	 (0.076)
Surgical	Medicine	 16,513.67***	 16,695.87***	 16,580.63***	 0.215**	
(3,800.83)	 (3,802.27)	 (3,808.61)	 (0.056)	
Psychiatric	Medicine	 ‐40,021.34***	 ‐40,379.86***	 ‐39,662.60***	 ‐0.52**	
(5,531.01) (5,539.89) (5,558.70)	 (0.084)
Obstetric/Gynecologic	
Medicine	 ‐4,872.24	 ‐4,920.70	 ‐4,820.37	 ‐0.076	
(5,674.61) (5,683.94) (5,671.43)	 ‐0.081
Certification	
Board	Certification	 17,085.50***	 17,277.49***	 17,010.44***	 0.272**	
(4,012.66) (4,009.86) (4,012.82)	 (0.062)
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Type	of	Practice	
Group	Practice	 23,646.30***	 23,982.88***	 23,865.87***	 0.378**	
(3,675.51) (3,675.21) (3,681.17)	 (0.055)
HMO	 21,806.40***	 21,721.31***	 22,180.73***	 0.407**	
(7,025.37) (6,977.12) (7,028.59)	 (0.105)
Medical	School	 10,937.81*	 10,897.75*	 11,156.57*	 0.201*	
(6,178.19) (6,183.95) (6,167.24)	 (0.090)
Hospital	 31,764.23***	 31,943.92***	 32,053.72***	 0.528**	
(5,325.86) (5,320.56) (5,335.08)	 (0.078)
Other	 29,746.30***	 30,433.37***	 30,525.08***	 0.524**	
(6,179.43) (6,168.59) (6,203.03)	 (0.096)
Time	Worked	
Hours	 11.51***	 11.51***	 11.37***	 0**	
(1.94) (1.94) (1.94)	 (0.000)
Ownership	in	Practice	
Partial	Ownership	 5,842.05	 5,905.83	 5,939.45	 0.116	
(4,021.82) (4,025.29) (4,030.31)	 ‐0.06
Employee	 ‐20,117.24***	 ‐20,226.74***	 ‐20,170.44***	 ‐0.235**	
(4,170.53) (4,175.96) (4,177.59)	 (0.062)
Independent	Contractor	 ‐15,585.50**	 ‐14,960.55**	 ‐15,608.25**	 ‐0.215*	
(6,796.51) (6,783.31) (6,811.04)	 (0.102)
Visits	per	week	
Clinical	Visits	 421.40***	 424.78***	 421.65***	 0.007**	
(37.94)	 (38.00)	 (37.99)	 (0.001)	
Hospital	Visits	 507.39***	 506.09***	 510.61***	 0.008**	
(74.57)	 (74.65)	 (74.87)	 (0.001)	
Nursing	Home	Visits	 ‐93.47	 ‐86.33	 ‐95.51	 0.002	
(486.02)	 (487.16)	 (487.67)	 (‐0.007)	
Types	of	Reimbursement	
Percentage	of	Medicare	
reimbursement	 ‐75.17	 ‐77.88	 ‐78.55	 ‐0.001	
(60.39)	 (60.32)	 (60.48)	 (‐0.001)	
Percentage	of	Medicaid	
reimbursement	 ‐102.96	 ‐100.30	 ‐109.14	 ‐0.001	
(70.76)	 (70.77)	 (70.62)	 (‐0.001)	
Percentage	of	prospective	
payment	reimbursement	 ‐21.08	 ‐20.57	 ‐22.45	 0	
(57.49)	 (57.45)	 (57.48)	 (‐0.001)	
Bonus	eligibility		 11,423.73***	 11,531.02***	 11,381.09***	 0.194**	
(2,431.98)	 (2,433.16)	 (2,436.59)	 (0.036)	
Race	of	patients	
Percentage	of	Black	
patients	 ‐351.62***	 ‐353.07***	 ‐354.70***	 ‐0.005**	
(85.37)	 (85.43)	 (85.56)	 (0.001)	
Percentage	of	Hispanic	
patients	 ‐162.52*	 ‐116.31	 ‐149.38	 ‐0.002	
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(94.51)	 (92.61)	 (94.85)	 (‐0.001)	
Percentage	of	Asian	
patients	 155.84	 110.06	 133.06	 0.001	
(253.04)	 (253.34)	 (254.32)	 (‐0.004)	
Race	of	Physician	
Hispanic	physician	 ‐12,879.18	 ‐12,633.30	 ‐15,856.91	 ‐0.243	
(9,325.84)	 (9,330.06)	 (10,608.27)	 (‐0.164)	
Black	physician	 ‐15,494.44	 ‐15,606.62	 ‐9,307.06	 ‐0.16	
(16,134.16)	 (16,124.60)	 (17,996.63)	 (‐0.25)	
Asian	physician	 961.05	 1,407.19	 4,853.01	 0.098	
(4,518.23)	 (4,514.45)	 (5,726.62)	 (‐0.086)	
Other	physician	 ‐8,874.96	 ‐9,009.58	 ‐9,061.89	 ‐0.149	
(9,589.75)	 (9,639.24)	 (9,613.73)	 (‐0.143)	
Language	parameters	
Cultural	competency	
training	 ‐7,545.61***	 ‐7,602.71***	 ‐7,553.25***	 ‐0.109**	
(2,484.88)	 (2,486.26)	 (2,487.69)	 (0.037)	
Number	of	non‐English	
languages	patients	speak	 927.04	 4,318.88***	 1,858.48	 0.032	
(1,903.04)	 (1,222.74)	 (2,216.17)	 (‐0.033)	
Interpreter	service	 9,155.10**	 8,572.26*	 0.116	
(4,091.26)	 (4,687.82)	 (‐0.069)	
Racial	Concordance	
Black	physician/patient	
interaction	 227.99	 223.64	 228.93	 0.004	
(409.76)	 (409.57)	 (408.51)	 (‐0.006)	
Hispanic	physician/patient	
interaction	 423.62	 400.14	 353.96	 0.005	
(287.23)	 (287.97)	 (282.42)	 (‐0.004)	
Asian	physician/patient	
interaction	 ‐219.19	 ‐246.28	 ‐178.81	 ‐0.003	
(414.43)	 (413.47)	 (424.73)	 (‐0.006)	
Language	Concordance	 	 	
Black	physician,	1	non‐English	
language	spoken	by	patients	 ‐17,115.25	 ‐0.291	
(15,616.70)	 (‐0.255)	
Black	physician,	2	non‐
English	languages	spoken	
by	patients	 ‐16,845.23	
	
‐0.124	
(15,686.68)	 (‐0.225)	
Black	physician,	3	non‐English		
languages	spoken	by	patients	 ‐2,715.59	 ‐0.027	
(15,013.29)	 (‐0.221)	
Hispanic	physician,	1		
non‐English	language	spoken	
by	patients	 16,656.52	
	
0.248	
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(12,714.71)	 (‐0.188)	
Hispanic	physician,	2		
non‐English	languages	spoken	
by	patients	 ‐1,632.02	
	
‐0.014	
(17,372.75)	 (‐0.276)	
Hispanic	physician,	3		
non‐English	languages	spoken		
by	patients	 ‐1,704.97	
	
‐0.044	
(14,619.94)	 (‐0.218)	
Asian	physician,	1	non‐English		
language	spoken	by	patients	 ‐4,347.11	 ‐0.11	
(7,822.12)	 (‐0.12)	
Asian	physician,	2	non‐English		
languages	spoken	by	patients	 ‐11,648.50	 ‐0.115	
(9,830.81)	 (‐0.143)	
Asian	physician,	3	non‐English		
languages	spoken	by	patients	 ‐9,424.15	 ‐0.158	
(8,721.80)	 (‐0.13)	
Cut	1	 0.186	
(‐0.127)
Cut	2	 1.206**	
(0.127)
Cut	3	 1.903**	
(0.129)
Cut	4	 2.416**	
(0.130)
Cut	5	 2.856**	
(0.131)
Constant	 102,634.87***	 103,282.68***	 102,434.98***	
(8,063.64) (8,078.32) (8,087.67)	
Observations	 4,043 4,043 4,043	
R‐squared	 0.392 0.391 0.393	
Note:	Standard	deviations	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
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Table	3.	Regression	results	for	Hourly	Wage	
		 OLS	1 OLS	2	 OLS	3
Dependent	Variable:	Hourly	Wage
		
Experience	
Beginning	year	of	practice	after	2005	 ‐19.12***	 ‐19.07***	 ‐19.09***	
(4.28) (4.28)	 (4.31)
Beginning	year	of	practice	2001‐2004	 ‐8.34**	 ‐8.33**	 ‐8.33**	
(3.77) (3.77)	 (3.77)
Beginning	year	of	practice	1996‐2000	 ‐2.91	 ‐2.92	 ‐2.95	
(3.41) (3.42)	 (3.41)
Beginning	year	of	practice	1991‐1995	 1.15	 1.10	 1.05	
(3.74) (3.74)	 (3.72)
Beginning	year	of	practice	1986‐1990	 ‐1.50	 ‐1.49	 ‐1.61	
(3.59) (3.59)	 (3.60)
Beginning	year	of	practice	1981‐1985	 ‐3.42	 ‐3.48	 ‐3.39	
(3.51) (3.52)	 (3.52)
Beginning	year	of	practice	1976‐1980	 1.50	 1.29	 1.37	
(3.79) (3.80)	 (3.80)
Gender	
Male	 7.11***	 7.18***	 7.13***	
(1.77) (1.77)	 (1.78)
Specialty	
Internal	Medicine	 ‐26.92***	 ‐26.94***	 ‐26.76***	
(2.29) (2.29)	 (2.31)
Family	Medicine	 ‐28.25***	 ‐28.30***	 ‐28.20***	
(2.35) (2.35)	 (2.35)
Pediatric	Medicine	 ‐23.30***	 ‐23.52***	 ‐23.45***	
(2.82) (2.82)	 (2.80)
Surgical	Medicine	 9.64***	 9.72***	 9.37***	
(2.54) (2.54)	 (2.48)
Psychiatric	Medicine	 ‐14.27***	 ‐14.43***	 ‐14.53***	
(3.87) (3.88)	 (3.87)
Obstetric/Gynecologic	Medicine	 ‐5.72*	 ‐5.74*	 ‐5.93*	
(3.19) (3.19)	 (3.16)
Certification	
Board	Certification	 9.38***	 9.47***	 9.60***	
(2.54) (2.54)	 (2.55)
Type	of	Practice	
Group	Practice	 11.08***	 11.24***	 11.08***	
(2.43) (2.42)	 (2.43)
HMO	 10.71**	 10.67**	 10.71**	
(5.02) (5.01)	 (5.02)
Medical	School	 ‐0.72	 ‐0.74	 ‐1.03	
(3.75) (3.75)	 (3.77)
Hospital	 14.34***	 14.42***	 14.25***	
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(3.71) (3.71)	 (3.64)
Other	 15.98***	 16.30***	 15.76***	
(4.58) (4.59)	 (4.59)
Ownership	in	Practice	
Partial	Ownership	 2.08	 2.11	 2.06	
(2.52) (2.52)	 (2.53)
Employee	 ‐5.55**	 ‐5.60**	 ‐5.64**	
(2.68)	 (2.68)	 (2.68)	
Independent	Contractor	 ‐1.22	 ‐0.93	 ‐1.16	
(5.00)	 (4.99)	 (5.02)	
Visits	per	week	
Clinical	Visits	 ‐0.01	 ‐0.00	 ‐0.01	
(0.02) (0.02)	 (0.02)
Hospital	Visits	 ‐0.27*** ‐0.27***	 ‐0.27***
(0.03)	 (0.03)	 (0.03)	
Nursing	Home	Visits	 ‐0.12	 ‐0.11	 ‐0.13	
(0.34)	 (0.34)	 (0.34)	
Types	of	Reimbursement	
Percentage	of	Medicare	reimbursement	 ‐0.05	 ‐0.05	 ‐0.05	
(0.04)	 (0.04)	 (0.04)	
Percentage	of	Medicaid	reimbursement	 ‐0.08*	 ‐0.08*	 ‐0.08*	
(0.04)	 (0.04)	 (0.04)	
Percentage	of	prospective	payment	reimbursement	 0.06*	 0.06*	 0.06	
(0.03)	 (0.03)	 (0.03)	
Bonus	eligibility		 3.96***	 4.01***	 4.09***	
(1.51)	 (1.51)	 (1.50)	
Race	of	patients	
Percentage	of	Black	patients	 ‐0.11**	 ‐0.11**	 ‐0.11**	
(0.05)	 (0.05)	 (0.05)	
Percentage	of	Hispanic	patients	 ‐0.04	 ‐0.02	 ‐0.04	
(0.05)	 (0.05)	 (0.05)	
Percentage	of	Asian	patients	 0.22	 0.20	 0.22	
(0.18)	 (0.18)	 (0.18)	
Race	of	Physician	
Hispanic	physician	 3.16	 3.27	 0.49	
(9.04)	 (9.04)	 (8.12)	
Black	physician	 ‐16.34**	 ‐16.39**	 ‐12.20	
(7.62)	 (7.62)	 (7.64)	
Asian	physician	 3.91	 4.11	 5.37	
(3.05)	 (3.06)	 (3.72)	
Other	physician	 ‐4.91	 ‐4.97	 ‐5.08	
(6.24)	 (6.25)	 (6.25)	
Language	parameters	
Cultural	competency	training	 ‐7.76***	 ‐7.78***	 ‐7.82***	
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(1.61)	 (1.61)	 (1.62)	
Number	of	non‐English	languages	patients	speak	 ‐1.17	 0.40	 ‐0.69	
(1.11)	 (0.71)	 (1.27)	
Interpreter	service	 4.25*	 4.01	
(2.58)	 (2.83)	
Racial	Concordance	
Black	physician/patient	interaction	 0.36	 0.36	 0.36	
(0.25)	 (0.25)	 (0.26)	
Hispanic	physician/patient	interaction	 0.08	 0.07	 0.09	
(0.24)	 (0.24)	 (0.24)	
Asian	physician/patient	interaction	 ‐0.07	 ‐0.08	 ‐0.02	
(0.29)	 (0.29)	 (0.30)	
Language	Concordance	
Black	physician,	1	non‐English		
language	spoken	by	patients	 ‐11.16	
(9.77)	
Black	physician,	2	non‐English		
languages	spoken	by	patients	 ‐7.33	
(11.02)	
Black	physician,	3	non‐English		
languages	spoken	by	patients	 ‐4.34	
(10.99)	
Hispanic	physician,	1	non‐English	
language	spoken	by	patients	 ‐2.13	
(6.86)	
Hispanic	physician,	2	non‐English	
languages	spoken	by	patients	 28.91	
(28.48)	
Hispanic	physician,	3	non‐English	
languages	spoken	by	patients	 ‐0.33	
(8.09)	
Asian	physician,	1	non‐English		
language	spoken	by	patients	 0.13	
(6.01)	
Asian	physician,	2	non‐English		
languages	spoken	by	patients	 ‐5.87	
(5.66)	
Asian	physician,	3	non‐English		
languages	spoken	by	patients	 ‐7.22	
(4.78)	
Constant	 91.27***	 91.57***	 91.06***	
(5.16)	 (5.17)	 (5.17)	
Observations	 4,043	 4,043	 4,043	
R‐squared	 0.157 0.156	 0.159
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Note:	Standard	deviations	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
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Table	4.	Regression	Results	for	Performance‐Based	Annual	Income	
	
		 OLS	1 OLS	2 OLS	3	 Ordered	probit
Dependent	Variable:	Performance	based	
income	
		 		
Experience	
Beginning	year	of	practice	
after	2005	 ‐732.19	 ‐478.67	 669.26	 0.018	
(10,283.54) (10,327.33) (10,416.52)	 ‐0.157
Beginning	year	of	practice	
2001‐2004	 21,948.03**	 22,302.93***	 21,538.60**	 0.361	
(8,518.57) (8,505.67) (8,555.83)	 (0.130)**
Beginning	year	of	practice	
1996‐2000	 35,018.87***	 35,072.85***	 34,942.52***	 0.535	
(7,602.39) (7,595.50) (7,627.38)	 (0.116)**
Beginning	year	of	practice	
1991‐1995	 41,173.48***	 41,019.74***	 42,208.64***	 0.649	
(7,924.47) (7,921.00) (7,953.64)	 (0.119)**
Beginning	year	of	practice	
1986‐1990	 34,591.98***	 34,856.44***	 35,342.58***	 0.568	
(7,530.41) (7,536.34) (7,570.47)	 (0.114)**
Beginning	year	of	practice	
1981‐1985	 29,396.21***	 29,155.25***	 29,216.10***	 0.46	
(7,973.48) (7,962.97) (8,018.31)	 (0.122)**
Beginning	year	of	practice	
1976‐1980	 26,482.11***	 26,025.41***	 26,900.15***	 0.432	
(8,363.69) (8,355.43) (8,372.23)	 (0.125)**
Gender	
Male	 32,653.64***	 32,877.08***	 32,392.72***	 0.505	
(4,661.35) (4,655.76) (4,703.02)	 (0.070)**
Specialty	
Internal	Medicine	 ‐59,785.91***	 ‐59,833.51***	 ‐60,272.86***	 ‐0.839	
(6,083.25) (6,070.80) (6,110.35)	 (0.091)**
Family	Medicine	 ‐74,281.40***	 ‐74,269.01***	 ‐74,429.51***	 ‐1.04	
(6,197.25) (6,200.85) (6,227.79)	 (0.094)**
Pediatric	Medicine	 ‐69,814.13***	 ‐70,095.73***	 ‐70,474.41***	 ‐0.989	
(7,580.13) (7,583.76) (7,621.42)	 (0.116)**
Surgical	Medicine	 15,274.17***	 15,566.10***	 15,339.77***	 0.226	
(5,467.25) (5,468.74) (5,481.77)	 (0.081)**
Psychiatric	Medicine	 ‐50,422.61***	 ‐50,465.43***	 ‐49,260.11***	 ‐0.686	
(12,564.72) (12,570.82) (12,690.45)	 (0.194)**
Obstetric/Gynecologic	
Medicine	 6,111.54	 6,243.64	 6,199.17	 0.113	
(8,863.23) (8,892.81) (8,871.66)	 ‐0.128
Certification	
Board	Certification	 14,159.65**	 14,311.91**	 13,283.23*	 0.219	
(7,103.45) (7,108.83) (7,078.05)	 (0.108)*
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Type	of	Practice	
Group	Practice	 24,703.94***	 25,042.16***	 24,806.71***	 0.406	
(5,803.58) (5,799.50) (5,809.26)	 (0.084)**
HMO	 21,521.16*	 21,579.70**	 22,087.00**	 0.438	
(11,093.99) (10,977.94) (11,084.68)	 (0.162)**
Medical	School	 18,421.16*	 18,370.06*	 19,683.62**	 0.323	
(9,740.70) (9,750.45) (9,663.15)	 (0.140)*
Hospital	 38,084.77***	 37,772.37***	 36,818.79***	 0.593	
(9,288.68) (9,304.58) (9,346.62)	 (0.134)**
Other	 19,154.38	 19,326.55	 20,244.82	 0.338	
(13,265.42) (13,218.50) (13,549.41)	 ‐0.201
Time	Worked	
Hours	 8.41***	 8.53***	 8.22***	 0	
(3.14) (3.14) (3.13)	 (0.000)**
Ownership	in	Practice	
Partial	Ownership	 ‐1,763.04	 ‐1,587.76	 ‐2,174.50	 ‐0.009	
(6,278.71) (6,281.25) (6,308.90)	 ‐0.092
Employee	 ‐19,778.38***	 ‐19,923.79***	 ‐19,852.11***	 ‐0.26	
(6,527.01) (6,535.52) (6,570.93)	 (0.095)**
Independent	Contractor	 ‐2,948.39	 ‐2,363.93	 ‐4,309.55	 ‐0.071	
(15,075.5) (15,041.10) (15,129.74)	 ‐0.222
Visits	per	week	
Clinical	Visits	 523.03***	 524.70***	 525.77***	 0.008	
(58.63)	 (58.60)	 (58.69)	 (0.001)**	
Hospital	Visits	 634.18***	 628.14***	 646.94***	 0.01	
(117.16)	 (117.06)	 (117.64)	 (0.002)**	
Nursing	Home	Visits	 ‐413.79	 ‐384.38	 ‐384.93	 ‐0.001	
(710.72)	 (711.93)	 (707.76)	 ‐0.011	
Types	of	Reimbursement	
Percentage	of	Medicare	
reimbursement	 ‐22.53	 ‐23.51	 ‐23.27	 0	
(95.86)	 (95.61)	 (96.73)	 ‐0.001	
Percentage	of	Medicaid	
reimbursement	 ‐220.27*	 ‐218.07*	 ‐231.44*	 ‐0.003	
(130.71)	 (130.89)	 (130.19)	 ‐0.002	
Percentage	of	prospective	
payment	reimbursement	 ‐37.61	 ‐35.29	 ‐50.41	 ‐0.001	
(103.40)	 (103.19)	 (103.26)	 ‐0.002	
Bonus	eligibility		 9,672.68**	 9,888.00**	 9,540.23**	 0.153	
(3,937.05)	 (3,940.91)	 (3,960.96)	 (0.058)**	
Race	of	patients	
Percentage	of	Black	patients	 ‐458.85***	 ‐459.99***	 ‐450.72***	 ‐0.007	
(131.10)	 (131.30)	 (131.03)	 (0.002)**	
Percentage	of	Hispanic	
patients	 ‐15.95	 42.31	 ‐4.72	 0	
(158.35)	 (155.20)	 (159.08)	 ‐0.002	
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Percentage	of	Asian	patients	 441.40	 389.41	 458.97	 0.005	
(399.62)	 (401.00)	 (402.34)	 ‐0.006	
Race	of	Physician	
Hispanic	physician	 3,119.60	 2,999.55	 7,962.55	 0.159	
(14,561.16)	 (14,702.53)	 (15,389.46)	 ‐0.223	
Black	physician	 ‐21,604.74	 ‐21,970.28	 ‐15,347.38	 ‐0.21	
(22,383.23)	 (22,109.45)	 (24,073.11)	 ‐0.332	
Asian	physician	 4,727.74	 4,475.13	 3,681.38	 0.074	
(7,061.64)	 (7,054.36)	 (8,697.03)	 ‐0.131	
Other	physician	 5,666.73	 4,974.89	 5,538.71	 0.097	
(17,786.27)	 (17,919.55)	 (17,925.98)	 ‐0.241	
Language	parameters	
Cultural	competency	
training	 ‐6,580.38*	 ‐6,600.58*	 ‐6,996.09*	 ‐0.101	
(3,965.43)	 (3,968.16)	 (3,985.85)	 ‐0.059	
Number	of	non‐English	
languages	patients	speak	 ‐782.69	 3,050.75*	 ‐105.44	 0.006	
(2,948.99)	 (1,830.18)	 (3,384.92)	 ‐0.05	
Interpreter	service	 10,136.09	 8,579.57	 0.121	
(6,198.24)	 (6,921.32)	 ‐0.103	
Racial	Concordance	
Black	physician/patient	
interaction	 437.44	 435.69	 366.16	 0.006	
(590.81)	 (585.56)	 (574.94)	 ‐0.008	
Hispanic	physician/patient	
interaction	 ‐54.95	 ‐79.27	 ‐361.67	 ‐0.006	
(490.55)	 (495.57)	 (467.47)	 ‐0.007	
Asian	physician/patient	
interaction	 ‐1,162.42	 ‐1,149.79	 ‐1,203.85*	 ‐0.017	
(716.14)	 (713.98)	 (716.80)	 ‐0.011	
Language	Concordance	
Black	physician,	1	non‐English	l	
anguage	spoken	by	patients	 ‐22,620.40	 ‐0.448	
(23,649.74)	 ‐0.346	
Black	physician,	2	non‐English		
languages	spoken	by	patients	 ‐2,374.43	 0.031	
(25,947.59)	 ‐0.344	
Black	physician,	3	non‐English		
languages	spoken	by	patients	 6,448.10	 0.071	
(20,569.66)	 ‐0.3	
Hispanic	physician,	1		
non‐English	language	spoken		
by	patients	 27,022.82	
0.342	
(21,726.50)	 ‐0.309	
Hispanic	physician,	2		
non‐English	languages	spoken		 8,553.77	 0.221	
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by	patients	
(26,864.56)	 ‐0.517	
Hispanic	physician,	3		
non‐English	languages	spoken		
by	patients	 ‐41,573.30*	
‐0.505	
(22,729.34)	 ‐0.327	
Asian	physician,	1	non‐English		
language	spoken	by	patients	 5,165.05	 0.017	
(12,622.84)	 ‐0.193	
Asian	physician,	2	non‐English		
languages	spoken	by	patients	 ‐12,884.42	 ‐0.165	
(14,419.97)	 ‐0.207	
Asian	physician,	3	non‐English		
languages	spoken	by	patients	 10,638.25	 0.136	
(13,740.43)	 ‐0.197	
Cut	1	 0.133	
‐0.214
Cut	2	 1.14	
(0.213)**
Cut	3	 1.883	
(0.215)**
Cut	4	 2.435	
(0.217)**
Cut	5	 2.852	
(0.219)**
Constant	 100,985.74***	 101,270.95***	 102,340.73***	
(13,886.29) (13,895.33) (13,914.47)	
Observations	 1,802 1,802 1,802	
R‐squared	 0.375 0.374 0.378	
Note:	Standard	deviations	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
	
